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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN F. HAWKINS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 






This is :an action for property damage arising 
from an intersection collision at the intersection of 
Tremont Street and First South in Tremonton, Utah. 
DrSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Honorruble Lewis Jones on the morning of the 
tri'al disqualified himself and this case was heard, 
pursuant to stipula!tion by the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, Judge of The City Court of Brig-
ham City, Utah. Sitting without a jury, Judge 
Christoff er sen made Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of law in favor of the driver making a left 
turn in front of the oncoming driver and judgment 
was made and entered in :fiavor of the plaintiff in 
the sum of $181.93. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Helen H. Allen, the appellant, wants the judg-
ment in the lower court reversed and judgment of 
''No Cause of Action" entered in her favor. 
STATEMENT OF MATE'RIAL FACTS 
This accident happened on May 4, 1963 in broad 
daylight (TR 13) at the intersection of Tremont 
Street and First South in Tremonton, UtJah ('TR 9). 
The accident occurred at an open intersection and 
there were no traffic signs present at the time of 
the accident (TR 10). Mr. Hawkins sa:id he did 
not observe the danger of a collision (TR 10) until 
the Allen car was three or four feet from colliding 
with h'is car. (TR 10) At the precise moment of 
the impact, Mr. Hawkins was driving out of the 
'left turn made in front of the oncoming Allen car 
(TR 2). Mr. Hawkins testified that the speed of 
the Allen vehicle at the time of the collision was 
10 to 1'2 miles an hour ('TR 6) , and that he also 
at the ti'me of the accident was go'ing 10 or 12 
miles an hour (TR 9) . 
Before entering the intersection, Mr. Hawkins 
testified he saw Mrs. Allen's car parked in front 
of the post office some 25 or 26 steps south of the 
corner where the turn was made (TR 2). Mr. 
Hawkins judged his car was approximately 125 
feet from the Allen car when he first observed it. 
Mr. Hawkins testified that he had no vision 
head-on in his right eye at the time of the accident 
(TR 11). 
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There is a curb on the east side of Tremont 
Street (TR 5) and Mr. Hawkins testified as Mrs. 
Allen drove north she was driving along the curb 
line ('TR 5). First South has a paved roadway wide 
enough for two cars and there is 15 to 18 feet from 
the south edge of the roadway to the south side of 
First South street (TR 6). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE FOLLOWING 
P ARTI'CULARS: 
A. FAILING TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY 
TO 'DRE DEFENDANT. 
B. IN NOT KEEPING A PROPER LOOKOUT. 
POINT rI 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT FAIL TO SUPPORT A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AS THE LOWER 
COURT FAILED TO FIND THE DEFENDANTS NEGLI-





AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRl'BUTORY NEGLIGENT IN NOT YIELDING 
THE RIGHT OF WAY TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The collision occurred in an intersection. Sec-
tion 41-6-8 defines intersection as follows: 
"Intersection ( 1) The area embraced 
U'ithin the prolongation or connection of the 
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lateral curblines, or if none, then the lateral 
boundary. lin~s. of the road,,-ays of two high-
ways which JOln one another at, or approxi-
mately at, right angles, or the area \\ithin 
which ,-ehicles traYeling upon different high-
ways joining at any other angle come in con-
flict." (Emphasis added) 
Section -11-6-73, l:tah Code Annotated 1953 
reads as follows: 
"Yehicle nuning left at intersection - The 
driYer of a ,-ehicle within an in:er3€-Ction in-
tending to tlll'n to the left shall yield tI'.e right 
of way to any ,-ehicle a pp!·c1ac:IT:.ng from the 
opposite direction wxcn is ~:..~:r~ ~e inter-
section or so close t2-'_ere:..:1 a.=: t(1 c·=·nstitute 
an immediate haza!·d. dlU..:.J:g ~e- :::~e when 
such driYer is rn(n--=illg ~:~2.n ::I:.e ~-::er3ec­
tion. '' 
_Vfirmati,-ely. the e\icieT.ce s::0:·W3 ::::..?.: at the 
time 1.'lf the rt""iliis:1..1n. eac::: ,-c-:--=.c~c- ws..=: g·=·~g 1(1 to 
1 ·~ 'l' "TI .l''lll' '- -'r-.::. ----=--~- .... --.,-.--,.-,·-~ \\e;;t - llll t'~ ~1 .I._ • -~ •--C 1_'•.'._::-:::-_·_ .• -'-'-..4.---':°1.J. ~ 
f l · , ~ ,.bl:' 11° T)·-n· -~- .;;:-c·- -- --~ - ---=,~·nee (l t lt' t' .. 1~t \.: lL ._.Le '- • c-._._ -- . ~ -- '="='.. • .. e -:: ·• ~e l 
mhiispu tedly s!:.1.•ws :::::s c.,:, ~s:: .:-. :'---...:·...:..:.·~·-=-:: :.:-. an 
· ,"I ... -a-: 1, . ..,.,,, .: ... :, ..... --= ... --~----: :-..... - ,~~- H·=:\~' llltt.~t'( •. 1.L, .... 1.1 .. -· .:.,. ______ c-_. ~: _J._, ~ ~, 
1 ) 1. :l -:-·~ ~-, ,, .. -.;, .- · _.:-._ __, --· --- -- ~he t lt p .1 .• 1, . .J...J.., --C' .... : •• c- .: -C'-- --·--- --- -- ---- -- -· 
1 I' ' 1 n l; , , ~· ' · · -'" ,- · ·- : '· , l 1.\..\. ......... ~ _-\. ..... \.. ... e .... -\.. ... e. 
.. -- - ........ _... - - ... -- .... 
. . 
::· .. :__.;.:::; :-:'.:' 
knows when he is going to turn, and the opposing 
driver does not, and in fact, the opposing driver 
must discover when and if the turn is going to be 
made. In Cederloff vs. Whited (1946) 110 U. 45, 
169 P. 2d, 777, where the testimony showed the 
plaintiff was driving north on State Street in Salt 
Lake City in the center northbound lane and that 
the defendant was driving south at a point 200 
feet north of Ninth South, and where then the de-
fendant turned his car left directly in the path of 
the plaintiff's vehicle and the two collided a few 
feet east of the centerline at a time when the on-
coming vehicle was going only 25 to 30 miles an 
hour, this court granted a new trial, saying the de-
fendant in making a left turn solely and proximately 
caused the collision. 
In French vs. Utah Oil Company (1950) 117 
U. 406, 260 P. 2d, 1002, where a directed verdict 
against the driver making a left turn was affirmed, 
and where prior to the time of the collision, the left-
turning plaintiff admitted he saw the defendant's 
truck 120 feet away, this court said: 
"Plaintiff elected to turn the risk of clearing 
the intersection ahead of the oncoming truck 
which was so close that even though it was 
moving at a reasonable rate a speed, a colli-
sion could not be avoided. In doing so, he met 
his own mishap and his negligence contributed 
to his injury and prohibits his recovery." 
In Walker vs. Peterson (1954) 3 U. 2d 54, 278 
P. 2d, 291, this court affirmed a finding that the 
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driver making the left turn was negligent in failing 
to yield -the right of way. 
'The evidence most favorable to the respondent, 
Mr. Hawkins, shows that from where the respon-
dent claimed he saw the appellant's vehicle stopped 
at the curb, the appellant's vehicle traveled some 60 
to 75 feet to reach the point of impact, and the 
respondent admits at the time of the impact, Mrs . 
.A:llen's vehicle was going only 10 to 12 miles per 
hour. At 10 miles an hour, you're traveling 14.7 
feet per second, and a;t 12 miles an hour, 18 feet 
per second. If Mrs. Allen came from a stop as Mr. 
Hawkins testimony states, then her average speed 
based on his testimony from the place where she 
stopped, would have been 5 or 6 miles an hour, and 
at 6 miles an hour, you are merely going 9 feet per 
second. 
As Mr. Hawkins was not slowing, his averiage 
speed had to be something in excess of the 10 or 12 
miles per hour he was going at the time of the 
impact. In the decision on the Motion for New Trial 
(R 26), the lower court said the plaintiff had com-
pleted the left turn and was proceeding in an easter-
ly direction from the intersection at the time of the 
collision. The decision on the Motion for a New 
Trial recognizes that there is a curbline along the 
east side of Tremont Street. As a matter of law 
the defendant's vehicle was approaching the inter-
section at the time the plaintiff commenced the left 
turn as it would appear to Mrs. Allen over twice 
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as long to reach the point of impact from the place 
where she allegedly stopped as it would have Mr. 
Hawkins. 
It is submitted that the lower court made Find-
ings of Fact and reached the conclusions it did be-
cause it did not consider the statutory definition 
of an intersection. It is believed that erroneously 
the lower court assumed the collision did not occur 
within an intersection as it assumed the intersection 
was bounded by the edge of the roadway and not 
by the curbline. If we accept the theory that 
the east edge of the roadway of Tremont Street 
constituted the east edge of the intersection, then 
it's possible to undertand how the lower court found 
Mrs. Allen was not a pp roaching the intersection, 
1and that at the time the collision occurred, the 
Hawkin's oar was proceeding east from the in-
tersection. If, however, we accept the sta:tutory 
definition as set forth in Section 41-6-8, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, that the intersection embraces the 
area within the prolongations of the lateral curb-
lines, then you must find Mr. Hawkins who had 
made a left turn to go east in front of an oncoming 
northbound car, as a matter of law, did not yield 
the right of way to a vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which was within the intersec-
tion or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard to the safe movement of Mr. Allen's car in 
making a left turn. 
It is further submitted that there is evidence 
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as to the distance plaintiff traveled to reach the 
point of impact as he testified as to his speed at the 
time of the impact. Further, regardless of the width 
of the street involved, the driver making the left 
turn has no right to make a left turn when a vehicle 
is approaching from the opposite direction which 
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to 
constitute an immedia:te hazard and that the mere 
fact the plaintiff commenced his turn 120 or 
150 feet before the impact would not have afforded 
the plaintiff the right of way for being in the inter-
section first. 
Unless the statutory definition of intersection 
is of no force and effect in Box Elder County, the 
plaintiff and respondent Mr. Hawkins, failed to 
yield the right of way to the vehicle which was so 
close as to constitute an immedi1ate hazard at the 
time he entered and during the time during which 
he was making his left turn. 
POINT I 
B 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS IN FAILING 
TO KEE'P A PROPER LOOKOUT. 
This accident occurred just after noon in broad 
daylight. There were no other cars on the street and 
the view of neither driver was obstructed by objects. 
However, the record shows the plaintiff and respon-
dent, Mr. Hawkins was blind in the right eye and 
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had no head-on v1s10n in that eye. The evidence 
shows that although at the time of the impact it 
was observed the speed of Mrs. Allen's vehicle was 
only 10 to 12 miles an hour, that nevertheless, the 
hazard or danger of !an impact was not noticed by 
Mr. Hawkins until the front of the Allen car was 
three or four feet from the side of the Hawkin's 
vehicle, and then it was noticed only after the pass-
enger in Mr. Hawkin's car called his a:ttention to 
the fact that a collision was abount to occur. 
In Conklin vs. Walsh (1948) 113 U. 276, 193 
P. 2d, 43 7, the court held it was the duty of the 
driver on the arterial to keep a proper lookout just 
as well as to require the same of the driver entering 
the intersection, and that neither driver could ex-
cuse his own failure to see the other. In Johnson vs. 
Syme (1957) 6 U. 2d 319, 313 P. 2d 468, where 
the plain tiff failed to see a vehicle entering the 
intersection until ~t was directly in front of her 'at 
a distance of 20 to 30 feet away, at a time when 
the car entering the intersection was going 10 to 
20 miles per hour, a summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant was affirmed, and the court said 
that in failing to see the decedant's vehicle until she 
was 20 or 30 feet from it, she was contributory negli-
gent 'as a matter of law, and that she either looked 
and f!ailed to see the obvious, or failed to look at 
all, and under the circumstances, either way, she 
was negligent as a matter of law. 
In this particular case, Mr. Hawkins did not 
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observe the danger of a collision until the side of 
his car was three or four feet from the point of im-
pact, and then only after his attention was called 
to the danger by a passenger. It can be argued that 
Mrs. Johnson in Johnson vs. Syme, supra, was five 
times as prudent as Mr. Hawkins, even though she 
was held to be contributory negligent as a matter 
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCUUSIONS 
OF LAW FAIL TO SHOW THE LOWER COURT FOUND 
THE AOCIDENT IN QUESTION WAS PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED iBY THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Said the lawyer, "I'm unhappy because 
The decision is full of flaws. 
The sound of the judge's voice, 
Made it impossible for the defendant to rejoice. 
The decision fails to state Proximate Cause. 
The lower court made no findings of f'act on 
the proposition of whose negligence proximately 
caused the collision in question ( R 22). 
•1, 
The purpose of Finding of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law is to 1aid the appellant court and to 
afford the appellant court wi1th a clear understand-
ing as to the basis of the lower court's decisio1; • 
(Merrill vs. Merrill (1961) 362 P. 2d 887, 83 Idahr 
306). 
In Rogge vs. Weaver ( 1962) ____ Alaska ----
368, P. 2d 810, the court stated the purpose of the 
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requirement that Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law be made by the trial court is to enable an 
appellant cout to aetermine grounds upon which the 
tnal court reached it's decis10n, and to enable tht> 
defeated party to dete1·mine whether the case pre-
sents a quest10n wortny of consideration by the 1ap-
pellan t court and to spare the appellant court the 
necessity of searching the record in order to supply 
f mdings of Fact. 
In Harmon vs. Rasmussen (1962) 13 U.2d 4'22, 
375 P. 2d 762, where pleadings made an issue on 
whether a prescriptive easement for 1an irrigation 
ditch had been required and there was undisputed 
evidence that the ditch had been used for 20 years, 
a direct finding on that issue was held to be required 
and in the absence of the finding, this court re-
versed the lower court. 
In the State of New Mexico ex. rel. S. E. Rey-
nolds vs. Board of City Commissioners of County 
of Guadalupe (1962) 376 P. 2d, 976, 71 N.M. 194, 
the court held Rule 52 (b) required in non-jury cases 
for the trial court to make Findings of Fact on ma-
terial issues. 
Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
, ~ads as follows: 
"52 (b) Amendment. Upon motion of a 
party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgmen~t the court ma;y: amend the 
judgment accordmgly. The mCYtion .may be 
made with a motion for a new trial pur-
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SUJant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are. 
made in actions tried by the court without 
a jury, the ques1tion of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may there-
after be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the dis-
trict court an objection to such findings or 
has made either a motion to amend them, a 
motion for judgment, or 1a motion for a new 
trial." 
Further, Rule 52 ( c) provides that except in 
divorce cases, findings of fact and conclusion of law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact by 
default, by consent in writing, filed in the cause, 
or by oral consent in open court entered in the 
minutes. 
The Findings of Fact ( R 22) don't show 
whether or not the defendant was negligent in fail-
ing to keep a proper l'Ookout or failing to yield the 
right of way or in some other particular, nor do 
they show a finding as to where in the intersection, 
the collision occurred, or if in fact, the court made 
a determination on this point. 
In effect, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law show the lower court reached a conclusion, 
but that it did not make any findings of fact in sup-
port thereof. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R 22) fail to show a single ground upon 
which negligence is based, and it is submitted not 
having found any ground that it is impossible to 
assume what the proximate cause of the action was 
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found to be by the lower court. Because the Finding 
of Fact fail to show specific grounds upon which 
negligence is determined by the lower court and 
also fail to show upon what ground the lower court 
determined the defendant's negligence, if any, proxi-
mately caused the accident, it is difficult to deter-
mine how the case was lost in the lower court. In 
fact, if you read the decision on the Motion for a 
New Trial ( R 26) , you can conclude that the lower 
court found the collision occurred after the plain-
tiff's vehicle had left the intersection which is di-
rectly opposed to the Finding of Fact contained in 
the record at R. 22. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Allen is entitled to a Pyrrhic Victory. The 
lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, 
-------------------------------..... --.. ------- .... ------ ........ ---- .. --
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
1473 South 11th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I hereby certify that on thi~ -----------: day. of 
January, 1965, I mailed two copies ?f th:is Bnef, 
by United States mail, postage prepaid, to Joel M. 
Allred, Attorney for the Pliaintiff, 15 East 4th South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
------------- --------- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- ......... -- ------- -----------.. 
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